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1 e 0 INTRODUCTION 
The test operation of nuclear power plants, specifically nuclear rockets, bears 
some interesting similarities to the operation of chemical rocket tests as well as, 
of course, many differences. A significant feature common to both nuclear and 
chemical rocket tests is that all the fuel for the entire operation is loaded at the 
start of the test. As a direct consequence of this fact, the operation of nuclear 
power plants must be surrounded with adequate safety precautions, as is indeed 
the case in the operation of chemical rockets, A second direct consequence is 
that in  both types of testing a very thorough and complete checkout is made before 
starting the test. 
On2 of the more obvious differences that exists in testing nuclear power plants 
is the difference in the environment. Here we have the radiation to contend with 
in addition to the conditions present in chemical rockets like heat and vibration. 
In the case of a lightly shielded reactor, such as would be required for a nuclear 
rocket, it is impossible to approach the power plant without protection after any 
significant amount of testing has taken place, This is, of course, because of the 
high radiation field that will exist at this time. In some respects this problem 
makes the ground testing of a nuclear rocket resemble the flight testing of a 
chemical rocket in  that all the checkout has to be done before the testing begins 
at all. Once the test  has gotten well started, it is then too Late to do very much 
about a malfunction which may occuro There a r e  various stepsp such as shielding 
and remote handling, which can be taken to reduce this problem, but these are not 
always satisfactory. This will be discussed further la ter  i n  the lecture. 
A second very important difference in the operation of a nuclear rocket is that 
it is impossible to shut the nuclear power plant off completely after it has been run- 
A significant amount of power is generated for long times after operation and this, 
of course, leads to a number of operational problems which we will discuss later on. 
Another difference which should be m e n ~ o n e d  is that in the case of doing nuclear 
tests,  it is necessary to build a full size reactor, o r  nearly so, and nots for example, 
start with a 1/10 scale model. This is because it is necessary to provide a minimum 
amount of nuclear fuel to make the reactor work at all., Although it is possible to 
achieve high temperatures by running at Pow power and low coolant nowo this may 
not provide a r ed i s t i c  test of the system. 
large rea%brs: which a r e  limited by heat transfer a r ea  rather than reactivity. 
This consideration does not apply to very 
cant difference is that after the nuclear test has been completed 
and analysis of the power plant requires the special techniques of 
remote handling, which will be discussed later 
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2.0 PURPOSES OF TESTS 
Before proceeding further with the discussion of test operations, it is worth- 
One while to identify the objectives or purposes for which the test is to be run. 
category consists of obtaining research information. This type of test involves a 
reactor or power plant which is designed with no specific application but which is 
intended to obtain information in order to guide future design efforts. 
Transfer Reactor Experiments which were described to you in Lecture #I f a l l  
primarily into this category, as do the KIWI tests. 
tests is usually referred to as development. 
verify the design of a power plant which is expected to have a useful mission. 
This is basically the role of the early NERVA tests,  
to achieve and demonstrate reliability. Because of the cost it is difficult to pursue 
reliability with nuclear reactors in the classical way by building and testing a large 
number of samples. By keeping in  mind which objectives a r e  applicable to a par- 
ticular test, it is possible to get a better perspective of the design and operation, 
The Heat 
The second classification of 
Here the purpose is to perfect and 
The third test  objective is 
3.0 TEST FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 
3.  I Radiation Protection at Test Facility 
The facilities required to ca r ry  out the testing of nuclear power plants of the 
general type that would be applicable to nuclear rockets have certain fundamental 
requirements. The first requirement is protection of the personnel carrying out 
the tests. 
shielding, it is necessary for the facility to provide protection from the radiation 
generated during the test, 
plished, we can look at the Initial Engine Test Facility which was used dwing the 
ANP programc 
shielding was abtained by putting the entire control and equipment building under- 
ground and covering it with 15 feet of dirt, 
f rom the reactor also served to protect the operators from accidents such as a 
nuclear runaway, or a chemical explosion caused from the je t  fuel which was used 
during the tests. An alternative procedure for protecting the operators would be to 
provide separation between the operators and the reactor as is done in the facilities 
at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station, 
Since a mobile propulsion reactor can afford only a small amount of 
As an illustration of one way in  which this can be accom- 
Figure I shows an aerial  view of the PET, In this facility the 
This same  protection from the radiation 
The facility must provide a means for personnel to get in and out both during 
At the IET, as can be seen from the photograph, 
normal operation and in the event of an accident which might spread radioactive 
contamination in  the vicinity. 
there is a tunnel which permits vehicles to enter and leave the facility during dl 
power plant operations. This same approach was used at the Flight Engine Test 
Facility i 
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Fig. 1 - Aerial photograph of the I n i t i a l  Engine T e s t  f ac i l i t y  
F igure  2 - Artist's sketch of the Flight Engine Test Facility 
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3 . 2  Viewing During Test Operation 
Now having placed the operators underground, as i n  t having s epar - 
ated them from the power plant as is done in the Nevada it is necessary 
to provide visual access between the operators and the power plant. At the PET 
this visual access was provided by periscopes. At the Flight Engine Test Facili$y 
at Idaho (Figure Z ) ,  as another example, a direct viewing window was provided. 
This unusual viewing window had to provide both gamma and neutron shielding. 
Television is the third possible solution to the problem, appropriate for remote 
the ones in  Nevada, All these systems have various advantages 
s which must be evaluated during facility design. Fortunately, 
f does not impose m y  unusual requirements for visual access, 
which is needed for observation of secsndapy systems and to watch for chemical 
fuel leaks, fires, etc. 
3 . 3  Handling and Maintenance 
Another requirement is access to the power plant. Here the principal problem 
to be overcome is that the power plant cannot be approached after operation, as 
was mentioned earlier.  In dl the tests that were actually conducted in  the IET, 
the HTRE series,  enough shielding was provided on the power plant to permit at 
least  limited maintenance of the power plant after shutdown. For prototype air- 
craft  power plants, as far  nuclear rockets, the shielding would be considerably 
less ,  so  that m a n d  of "contact" maintenance would be impossible. It is, of 
course, possible to disconnect the power plant and return it to the special remote 
handling facilities, or "Hot Shop", a picture of which is shown in Figure 3 ,  
Although this may be the best way to handle single rocket firing tests,  it is likely 
to involve undesirable delays for longer test ser ies ,  for instance, when demon- 
strating restart capability, as will be appropriate as nuclear rocket technology 
advances beyond its present state. A$ the FET some capability for performing 
maintenance with manipulators was provided with the so-called "Beetle", which is 
now in Nevada. 
shielded vehicle carrying manipulatars and mounted on an a rmy  tank type chassis . 
It would also be possible to provide remote manipulators as part of the regular 
facility equipment.. A final and very important way of providing adcess to the 
power plant for mimtenance, at least for very limited amount of time, would be to 
provide portable shields to d l a w  peo 
maintenance items. 
i 
Figure 4 is a phstograph of the Beetle. This is a one-man 
e to approach the power plant and do small 
The operating scheme which was used in  the tes t  facilities in  Idaho provided that 
the power plant be mounted on a dolly which could be removed from the test facility 
and taken to the Hot Shop for maintenance. With this system the facility must make 
provisions for  connections between the power plant dolly and the facility. Typical 
things that must be connected are:  control and instrumentation wiring; coolants, 
including aftercooling; chemical fuel (turbojet fuel at the IET); samples of various 
fluids, for example, moderator water or  effluent gas; electrical power for the . 
7 
Figure  3 - Typical monitored entry in to  the Hot shop 
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Figure  4 - The Beetle 
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various auxiliary systems that a r e  mounted on the dolly; lubricating oil; and corn- 
pressed air. At the Initid Engine Test Facility all of these connections with the 
exception of the turbojet fuel and some of the compressed air were made up 
manually in a small shielded room at one en.d of the test cell, called the coupling 
station. 
connectors for fuel and compressed air were designed to make up automatically 
as the power plant rolled into position. 
3.4 Control and Data Systems 
The turbojet fuel was routed outside the coupling station for safety. The 
An important requirement for the test  facility is the provision of power plant 
control and data systems. 
the type of system that is needed, 
testing that was done at PET and that involved in  a nuclear rocket test. 
tests were carried out that would last for a hundred hours or more in  contrast to 
a nuclear rocket test with a duration of from 5 to 15 minutes, 
The time scale of the projected tests largely determines 
Here there is quite a difference between the 
At the IET 
a) Control System - At IET, during the HTRE tests,  it was possible to operate 
the power plants completely on manual control. That is to say ,  the power of the 
reactor could be adjusted by manually driving the shim control rods in and out, 
and the turbojet engines could be operated by increasing or  decreasing the flow of 
fuel and the a r e a  of the je t  nozzle. Provisions were also made, and generally were 
used, for the automatic control of the power plant. 
would adjust the power of the reactor to the selected value and other servo systems 
would control the temperature and speed of the turbojet engines. 
testing, because of the relatively Bong time involved in  operation, the selection of 
the desired reactor power, engine speed, and engine temperature were made man- 
ually by the operator, in  other words, he would simply select the conditions at 
which he wanted to operate at any time, 
because ~f the short test time available, in  all likelihood the control system would 
induds a p r o g r a ~ l m a r  which would automatically select the power level, the 
coolant flow rate? etc. which was desired in accordance with a schedule which had 
been determined in  advance. 
proceedp since things will happen a little to0 rapidly for the human. operator to 
follow and. understand them and take corrective actiono Nuclear system e!:~-tr&iI was 
discussed in considerable detail in  Lectures 13 and 14 (GEMP l90h and GEMP l90i). 
Hn this mode a servo system 
During the BET 
FOP a nuclear rocket test, in  ~ o n t r a s t ,  
This is about the o d y  way in  which such a test  can 
b) Data System At the IET an automatic data system WLS provided with 
capacity for recording some '700 points. 
mately 5 minutes, so that the system was most useful in measuring steady state 
information, 
scan was taken. Of course, some transient information was required for special 
tests, and some information was displayed on Brown recorders,  principally for 
the control 0l the operation. Howevero i n  general, all the testing involved rather 
slow changes and requirements for t r a d i e n t  data equipment were quite limited, 
The Flight Engine Test Facility used the same philosophy for its data system, but 
with advances in  d e c t m d c  techniques provided a capacity fsr recording about 
2000 points i n  less  than two minutes , It also provided increased flexibility iii 
These points were recorded in  approxi- 
The general procedure was to hold all conditions steady while a data 
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PO 
selecting the points to be recorded by using a punched tape input program, Never- 
theless, this data system was still designed primarily for steady state operatio-, 
Since at the FET the testing was going to involve a very large PO plant i n  a quite 
early stage of development, it was clear that the operators c o d  observe a d  
understand all that was happening fast enough to be sure  of taking corrective action 
fast enough. It was planned, therefore, to keep the data system in continuous 
dperation, scanning perhaps 500 points, which it could do in  less than a minute. 
The data would feed continuously into a digital co er which would be progr 
to search for off design points, and only these o gn points were then displayed 
or brought%a the attention of the operators, whereas data which was coming out as 
expected would be suppressed. 
portion of the power plant control system, 
The data system was thus an  integral and necessary 
For nuclear rockets, the time available to take corrective action i s  further cem- 
pressed, so that the next Logical develop= nt would be to have the digital computer 
not only reading the data and comparing them with predicted values, but then 
actually controlling the parameters such as reactor power, coolant flow, etc. i n  
order to bring the condition back to normal, to terminate the test, o r  to reduce 
power to a safe point in  event of difficulty, As another consequence of the reduced 
time scale of the tests, a great deal more emphasis would be placed on recording 
transient data continuously throughout th.e test, 
I 
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4.0 POWER PLANT TESTING 
4.1 Low Power Tests 
The first step that must be taken in the conduct of a reactor test  program :s ,  
of course, the assembly of the power plant, 
analogous to loading the fuel into a rocket, namely, t 
cautions to make sure  that it doesn't go off prematur 
not simply a routine manufacturing process to load a1 
reactor. For  the tests that were run in Idaho a special facility was  constructed 
for  this initial loading, called the Low Power Test Facility (shown in Figure 5). 
Here the fuel elements were loaded into the reactors under controlled conditions. 
Measurements were made to be sure that the right amount of fuel was being put in  
and that the reactor did not accidentally reach a critical mass prematurely. This 
was done by providing a source of neutrons and several neutron counters, 
waa typically loaded in increments of about 10% of the total, After each increment 
was  loaded the neutron flux was  measured. As more fuel was  added, approaching 
the critical mass, the neutron level would rise. 
counting rate, or  multiplication, it was  possible to predict quite accurately the 
point at which the reactor would become critical. After fuel loading was  completed 
the control elements were calibrated and measurements of the power distribution 
and other reactor physics measurements were made, In the case of HTRE #3,  
the power distribution was  actually shimmed in a fairly extensive program by 
p-utting in boroc strips to adjust the neutron flux to produce the desired nuclear 
power profile, 
Here one has problems rather 
the necessary pre-  
This means that it is 
fuel elements in the 
' 
Fuel 
By plotting the inverse of the 
After these steps were completed, the reactor could be returned to the manu- 
facturing facility. 
insure that no nuclear accidents can happen during transit or  during the final 
assembly operations, 
moderator water, 
loading were replaced by so-called transport rods. These rods had the character- 
istic that they would not fall out of the reactor in case it was  inadverien.tly dropped. 
Other acceptable systems would be to safety-wire the control mechanisms to pre-  
vent movement, or  to add poison in void spaces. 
Before doing sop the reactor must be made positively safe to 
F o r  HTRE #1 and #Z this could be done by draining out the 
For  I-ITRE #3 the control rods which were used for the critical 
With the reactor back in the manufacturing or  assembly area, it was combined 
with the remainder of the heat removal equipment and the power plant w a s  then 
taken to the Initial Engine Test Facility for power testing, 
4.2 Power Testing 
- Checkout - The first step at IET was the connection of all the various systems 
which we discussed before and a thorough checkout of the operation of these systems 
separately, a process completely analogous to preparing a rocket for firing. 
- Testing - After the checkout was  satisfactorily completed, a carefully planned 
During these series of tests was followed, involving a gradual approach to power, 
tests the power measuring instruments were calibrated, the effectiveness of the 
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Figure 5 - Aerial photograph of the Low Power Test f a c i l i t y  and the 
Shield T e s t  Pool f a c i l i t y  
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shielding measured and compared with calculations, the nuclear heating rate 
measured, and other tests of this nature performed. 
this part of the operation w a s  to car ry  out methodical increase in power, 
checking the operation of all instruments and systems and the stability of the 
power plant at every step, 
3 for the steps f rom a few watts  to the beginning of significant temperature 
increases In the reactor. 
or  more if needed to obtain data, 
rise noticeably, new power steps were set  for  temperature increases of 200°F 
to 300oF and the duration of operation at each step extended to about 2 hours, 
Fortunately, during all the HTRE tests this gradual approach to power could be 
carried out without difficulty, as it was always possible to shut down to make 
adjustments or  correct malfunctions, 
The primary purpose of 
Typically the power was  raised by a factor of about 
Power was held constant at each step for  15 minutes, 
When the fuel element temperature started to 
For nuclear rocket tests,  in contrast, the limited shielding, the high cost of 
coolant, and, possibly, the desire to avoid temperature cycling combine to 
dictate a far more rapid testing program, Testing up to a few kilowatts, where 
temperatures without coolant start to rise,  can be carried out as described above. 
At this point it is necessary to reach the decision to commit the power plant to 
operation, which wil l  be an irreversible step in many ways, especially since it 
will  thereafter be impossible to do unlimited maintenance around the power plant. 
Other considerations than radiation levels can result in an irreversible action 
associated with going to power, 
on nuclear power. 
power in the usual manner, using the standard jet engine s tar ters  to provide 
coaling air, but then It was necessary to increase the power rapidly, without turning 
back, in order to complete the start, 
exist in starting a nuclear rocket engine, 
start up q d t e  rapidly in order to provide enough pressure from the rocket chamber 
to power the turbo-pump, making it impossible to go gradually to full power. 
An example of this would be starting the HTRE #3 
In this case it was  possible to take the power plant up to low 
This is similar to the situation which might 
In this case, it might be necessary to 
- Shutdown - At the conclusion of a test ,  a normal, planned shutdown procedure 
would be followed, An alternative emergency shutdown procedure, called scram, is 
also invariably provided. In many cases a scram or  emergency shutdown is to be 
avoided if at all possible because it may result in  various types of damage to the 
reactor:, particularly from the stsndpoint of thermal shock, In general, a normal 
shutdown would proceed much more slowly and methodically than the emergency 
shutdown. The requirements for the emergency or  sc ram shutdown a r e  set  by some 
very pessimistic assumptions regarding the possibility s f  a nuclear malfunction, AS 
a rule, the scram system is designed to provide twice the amount of reactivity which 
is necessary to make the reactor prompt critical, that is, critical on prompt neutrons 
alone. The philosophy here  is that if some accident occurs which makes the reactor 
almost prompt critical, one wants to be able to compensate with an equal amount of 
emergency shutdownp which would stabilize the power and also to inser t  an equivalent 
amount of negative reactivity to make the reactor subcritical to reduce the power 
rapidly , 
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4.3 Aftercooling 
In the lecture #9 (GEMP-190f) there was a discussion of the afterheat generated 
by the reactor and the temperatures which it caused. 
operational problem in that it requires that some coolant be provided for long 
periods after operation, The fir zve, Figure 6 ,  shows the power generated in 
a reactor as a function of the ti e r  shutdown. As can be seen, for 15 minutes 
of operation, a, typical operati for rocket testing, the power 2 minutes after 
shutdown is still about 1% of full powerp and even after 30 minutes it is about 0.1%. 
For  time less  than 10 seconds after shutdown, the duration of operation is of little 
importance. If no coolant is supplied, this power will  cause temperatures to rise 
far beyond safe limits, as  is shown in Figure 1,31 of GEMP-l90f, 
curve it is clear that the time available to take corrective action before excessive 
temperatures occur is quite short, and become progressively shorter as the normal 
operating power is increased. 
The afterheat creates an 
From this 
The problem is aggravated by the change in energy distribution between the 
normal and afterheat cases- 
90% of the total energy generated, whereas after shutdown they may receive only 
60%, 
radiation with great penetrating power, 
must then be based on cooling the reflector and structural members, as  can be 
seen by comparing Figures 1.39 and 1.33 of GEMP-190f. 
example shownli an aftercooling airflow of 1.0 Ib/sec, 
adequate for the fuel elements, but that the reflector temperature r ises  appreciably 
For  normal operation the fuel elements receive about 
This is  because about half of the after shutdown power is released as gamma 
The coolant requirements after shutdown 
These show that f o r  the 
or even less,  would be 
I i 
even with 25 lb/sec, 
When the afterheat has decayed sufficiently, it is possib1et.s dissipate it by 
radiation without furnishing any coolant, 
depending upon the reactor design and operating history. Before this occurs, it 
wil l  be possible to turn off the aftercooling for  considerable periods of time, as 
is illustrated in Figure 7, To use this curve, which is for HTRE #1, the afterheat 
power Is first calculated from the operating history and time since shutdown. The 
cooling airflow required for steady-state conditions, and the length of time that the 
reactor can be left safely without forced cooling can be read directly. 
information is of particular value fox  such operations as remotely disassembling 
the power plant, or  moving from the test  cell to the Hot Shop, when the provision 
of cooling might be a problem, 
This may take tens or hundreds of hours 
This 
To illustrate the lengths to which designers may go to assure aftercooling, let 
us consider the HTRE #3 once again. 
shutting the reactor off and operating the turbojets on chemical power, 
jets were provided, and it was possible to operate either one of them in  the event 
First, a normal shutdown could be made by 
Two turbo- 
of a malfunc n of the other, 
it was possible to motor the turbojet engines on their s tar ters ,  which 
were run by compressed air f rom a set of diesel compressors, as long as the turbo- 
jets themselves did not have some serious malfunction which would prevent their 
rotation, 
16 
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Third, two primary aftercooling blowers were provided, consisting of large 
axial flow blowers mounted on a separate dolly, These were driven by 450 hp 
internal combustion engines, each blower delivery 12-5 pounds per second of 
cooling air. Two blowers were provided for redundancy so that if  one blower 
failed, the other one would be able to deliver the required airflow. 
J 
Since these primary blowers were very large and mounted on a separate dolly, 
it was necessary to provide smaller blowers for cooling the power plant for longer 
times after operation and while it was in transit  to the Hot Shop, 
"in transit" requirement, two more blowers were mounted on the power plant itself. 
These were centrifugal blowers driven by smaller internal combustion engines, 
providing something like 4 pounds per second of air apiece, Again two blowers 
were used so that If one failed the other one could car ry  the load, 
To meet this 
Since operation at the IET w a s  not performed around the clockC, it was 
necessary to face the problem of maintaining aftercooling when no one was  in 
the facility, 
reliable for this type of operation and so there were two electric blowers provided 
for  long-term aftercool.ing while at the IET. 
required to avoid the safety problems involved in operating and refueling gasoline 
engines in the Hot Shop. 
It was felt that the internal combustion engines were not sufficiently 
These electric blowers were also 
Thus, all told, ten reasonably independent sources of aftercooling air were 
provided for this power plant, 
4.4 Formalization of Test Procedure ! 
The foregoing bas described the general procedure to be followed in performing 
a nuclear power plant test. The actual procedure is, of coursep mucb more 
detailed, 
into account all foreseeable contingencies, 
in the test  program cannot be conveniently performed after operation at significant 
power since the reactor has become radioactive. 
carefully scheduled to obtain data in the proper sequence. Furthermore, a well 
planned and deliberate procedure is necessary to assure  safety prior to, during, 
and after operation, 
It is necessary to plan the detailed procedure in a manner which takes 
For  example, much of the data required 
Therefore, the test@ must be 
The documents which must be prepared to satisfy requirements of the Atomic 
Energy Commission a r e  identified in the subsequent lecture 
the organization having responsibility for  the reactor tes t  should prepare detailed 
written test  procedures for its own internal use, A sample instruction identifying 
several procedural documents, which should be prepared prior to reactor operatJon, 
is included as Appendix A. 
on Safety, In addition, 
4,5 References 
A brief summary of testing the HTRE #1, HTRE #2, and HTRE #3 reactors was 
given in lecture #I (GEMP-l90a), Details of the HTRE #l and HTRE #3 tests a r e  
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given in  References 1 and 2, 
operating nuclear rockets is given in  the following articles in the 
December 1962 Astronautics (Ref, 3).  
A discussion of several  aspects of testing and 
RIFT * .  ,. , ., . , . , .. , . o. , e . . , , , , . Col. W, Scott Fellows, p. 38, 
KIWI Development Testing . . . , , , . s. . ,-; ..Keith Boyer. p. 58 
Safety and Operations with Nuclear Vehicles * , . Lt, Col, Ralph S, Decker, p, 6 3  
1. APEX-904, Comprehensive Technical Report - General Electric Direct- 
Air Cycle Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Programo February 1962, 
2. APEX-906, comprehensive Technical Report - General Electric Direct- 
Air Cycle Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program, June 1962, 
3.  ASTRONAUTICS, December 1962, Vo107, No. 12, 
5.0 REMOTE HANDLING 
In the nuclear industry, remote handling may be defined as "The performance 
of a mechanical task using remote manipulating devices, allowing the operator to 
remain behind a radiation limiting barrier", In most cases, remote handling is 
thought of as operations involving assembly and disassembly, maintenance, or  
other operations, performed by remote control devices such as manipulators o r  
c rane s . 
Remote handling operations a re  necessary when manual performance or  the 
presence of human beings is prevented by the environment or  location of the work 
site. Environments of this type include high levels of nuclear radiation, high 
vacuum, high pressure,  deep underwater depths, high temperature and others 
which prohibit manual activity. 
most common locations of remote handling equipment, but others a re  presently 
in use on underwater vehicles, in vacuum chambers and in industries handling 
toxic mate rials 
Nuclear laboratories and research areas  a re  the 
The particular equipment used in remote handling varies widely with the 
application, but in general the remote equipment is used to engage, grip, and 
move o r  position a work piece, tool o r  item of hardware. This could be per-  
formed by a simple remote control crane o r  by a complex special purpose mani- 
pulator. The remote handling philosophy wi l l  also greatly influence the type of 
handling equipment used. 
I 
' 5.1 Remote Handling Philosophy 
The two extremes of remote handling philosophy with regard to the type of 
equipment used are: 
- Super Manipulator Philosophy - This philosophy involves the use of an 
extremely sensitive and dexterous manipulator which effectively replaces a 
human hand and arm. Conventional hand tools could be used by the manipulator, 
without modification, and few if any special tools, fixtures, or  special hardware 
a re  needed, Any job which could be performed by a man's hand could also pre-  
sumably be performed using this manipulator. 
would be very expensive, with the complex motions, small delicate parts, and 
The state of the art 
has progressed only partially toward this point today. 
Of course such a manipulator 
very sensitive force feedback system which is necessary. I 
- Simple Manipulator Philosophy - A very simple manipulator, with coordinate 
control, can be used to accomplish most remote tasks when aided by many special 
fixtures. 
greatly exceeding the manipulator in complexity and cost, while for  other operation 
little o r  no modification to existing tools would be necessary. 
makes use of the manipulator as a positioning device to locate and orient special 
tools and to transport other items of equipment, 
Fo r  some operations the necessary fixtures might be extremely elaborate, 
This philosophy 
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While the relative cost of manipulators and supporting fixtures might be used 
When using manipulators capable of only simple 
as a basis for  a reasonable decision as  to  which philosophy to follow, there a re  
other factors to be considered. 
motions, many limitations a re  placed on the freedom of the product designer. 
Experience has shown that remote operating time, reliability, and product 
weight generally suffer when extensive fixturing i s  necessary for a remote 
operation. 
manipulators and complex fixtures. 
Ultimate cost to complete the operation will r ise  rapidly with deficient 
The practical compromise on which type of equipment to use and which general 
philosophy to follow nearly always falls somewhere between the two extremes. 
Most experience has been in  the region nearer the "simple manipulator" concept, 
as development of the super manipulator is very costly and the reasonable limit of 
its potential is not as yet apparent. Development work is generally carried on 
only to the extent necessary to satisfy the requirements of a particular project, 
w ith advancements in the state of the art being incidental l o  the main goal. 
For  most remote operations a manipulator with adequate capacity and a 
reasonable amount of motion capability can be utilized, aided by power tools and 
special devices as necessary for particular requirements, 
Some of the techniques used to enable manipulators to accomplish various 
tasks which do not fall within the capability of the manipulator itself a re  as 
follows : 
- High torque requirement for large fasteners - the manipulator holds and 
positions an impact wrench to provide the desired function with reaction torque 
on the manipulator. 
- Engagement of a delicate electrical connector - a compliant wand is used 
between the connector and the manipulator hand, allowing the connector to be 
engaged without damage by the crudeo noncompliant motions of the manipulator. 
- Lift of a load exceeding manipulator capacity - the manipulator can be used 
to engage slings or  lifting devices for high capacity lifts by cranes or  higher 
capacity hoists .,
- Hammering o r  high impact operations - requiring rapid response exceeding 
that of the manipulator may be accomplished by use of a pneumatic hammer o r  
chipping gun held and positioned by the manipulator. 
Many tools a re  used including, jacks, vises, shears,  power saws, torches, 
power wrenches, abrasive cutters, vacuum cups and many other specialized 
devices to enable the relatively simple motion capability of the manipulator ,to 
accompli& more complex tasks, 
i 
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5 . 2 Manipulating Equipment 
1. - The most common type of mani- 
These units pulator i s  the Argonne type master -slave mechanical manipulator, 
have been in use at various laboratories and hot cells for many years. 
small, simple and low in cost, they can be installed through or  over the wal l s  of 
most hot cells. 
and provide the operator with a mechanical linkage force feedback, Larger units 
a r e  now available, capable of forces up to 50 pounds. 
Relatively 
They provide a 10  pound force capacity within their limited reach 
Mechanical manipulators a r e  inherently limited (by their mechanical connec- 
tions) to a very small work volume coverage and relatively low capacity due to 
friction and inertia, 
2. Electro-Mechanical Manipulators - The electro-mechanical type of mani- 
pulator (see Figures 8 and 9) which is very common in larger cells eliminates the 
work volume limitation, since the only connection between operator and manipu- 
lator is a control cable or  possibly a radiolink. Size range is also greatly 
expanded to essentially any size needed. 
driven by electric motors o r  hydraulic systemsp is moved about a hot cell-or work 
a rea  on mechanical boom systems or  in some cases by vehicles. 
available systems a r e  available today in capacity ranges from 10 pounds to 500 
pounds. The large units exert  forces of up to 2-1 /2  tons in certain directions. 
This type manipulator is generally 
Commercially 
However, the freedom f rom mechanical linkages which allows the unlimited 
I 
volume coverage and high force capacity is obtained at the virtual complete loss 
of force feedback and response rates. 
larger  force machines by operators using switch type controls, the speeds must 
be reduced to far l e s s  than that of the human a r m  and hand. 
lators a re  in general noncompliant and can exert large forces in unknown directions 
without the awareness of the operator. 
to handle without a great probability of damage. 
items can be handled with ease over long periods of time without operator physical 
f&'gue 
3. 
In order to allow safe control of these 
The sturdy manipu- 
Delicate items a re  difficult or impossible 
Conversely, large and heavy 
Servo -Manipulators - Combining the freedom of mechanical connection of 
the powered manipulator with the rapid response and force feedback (or feel) of 
the mechanfcal master slave manipulators is possible using a servo system of 
power and control. Smaller sized servo manipulators using electric motor servo 
systems have been made fo r  use at the Argonne PJ&onal Laboratory, 
sensitive 10 pound capacity manipulator and a l e s s  sensitive 50 pound model have 
been developed. 
master  slave manipulator capabilities in  size, capacity, and configuration of the 
hand and control grip. 
A relatively 
Both of these machines essentially duplicate the mechanical 
A larger more radical servo manipulator of about 125 pound capacity was  
developed by the General Electric Company during the ANP program for use at 
the Idaho Test Station, and is shown in Figures 10  and 11. * ' 
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Figure 8 - Stiff-boom wall-nounted GM model C mnipulntor 
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Figure 9 - Arm and hand assembly of the overhead manipulator 
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b 
Figure 10 - GE Handyman slave unit and its hydraulic power supply 
4 
Figure 11 - GE Handyman master unit 
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It is an electro-hydraulic machine with two arms, controlled by the physical 
The operator's motions a re  sensed motions of the operatorts arms and hands, 
by the master control unit attached to his arms and hands and the slave unit 
moves correspondingly. 
the master unit, 
counterweights, 
Forces  on the slave unit a r e  reflected to the operator by 
Electronic controls provide counterbalance without the use of 
All servo manipulator systems a re  very expensive, many times more so than 
a conventional manipulator of the same capacity. Servo manipulator use is there- 
fore limited to special applications where their unique combination of work volume 
coverage, rapid response and force feedback are  essential. 
5 . 3  Manipulator Mounting Systems 
The manner in which the manipulator is mounted for positioning at the work 
locations is a very important factor in the over-all capability of the manipulating 
system. 
Manipulators a r e  generally mounted in one of three ways in a hot cell or  hot 
shop and can also be mounted on mobile vehicles. 
- Through-wall Mount - Master slave type manipulators being fixed in posi- 
tion either through a hole or  over the top of the shield wall ,  a r e  immobile and 
therefore limited to the reach capacity of the manipulator itself. 
- Overhead Bridge Mount - The most common type of mounting for an electro- 
mechanical manipulator is hanging it from a telescoping tube on an overhead 
bridge and trolley as shown in Figure 9. In this manner the bridge moves along 
the cell, the trolley moves across  the cell and the telescoping tube provides the 
vertical positioning, 
beyond the telescoping tube and is limited in access to the underside of work 
objects. 
well as with bridge mounted cranes, 
This system, however, is restricted in the horizontal reach 
Multiple units of this type in a cell will  interfere with one another as 
- W a l l  Booms - By providing manipulator mounts On wall booms, multiple 
units can operate in conjunction with overhead cranes and manipulators as well  
as units on the opposite wal l  as shown in Figure 8. This system is employed in 
larger hot cells where many items of equipment must use the same work volume 
with the maximum utility, 
These wall  booms traverse the length of the shop in both the Idaho and Nevada 
hot shops and can also travel vertically and swing through 180° in a. horizontal 
plane, 
operating in a manner similar to bridge mounted units. 
of manipulators in the Idaho Hot Shop, 
The bridge type manipulators t raverse  the length of these craatilever booms 
Figure 12  shows the layout 
An articulated boom, which has the manipulator attached to its tip presents 
some advantages. One unit in use telescopes, swings through a vertical a rc ,  ro- 
tates almtat its own axis and swings the manipulator telescoping tubes through an 
arc. 
direction on the workpiece. 
This is an  extremely versatile system, allowing access from nearly any 
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Figure 12 - In te r ior  view of the Hot Shop, looking west 
c 
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- Vehicle Mounting - Another manipulator mounting system which has become 
available in recent years is the mobile o r  vehicle mount. Small vehicles, such as 
the electric fork-lift truck type may mount the manipulator solidly on the chassis, 
or on the elevating fork mount. 
allow greater height and volume coverage. 
. 
Larger vehicles a r e  equipppd with boom mounts to 
The very large "Beetlett shielded c 3b vehicle is equipped with two GM-550 
electro-mechanical manipulators on telescoping boom mounts. The booms and 
entire cab can also be rotated about a vertical axis and elevated on telescoping 
cylinders to increase the work volume, (Fj.gure 4) 
Small vehicles such as the Hughes t'Mobot'' have the manipulator arms located 
In this type of system there is a question of nomenclature - where 
such that they can reach the floor and cover the design work height without the 
use of booms, 
is the manipulator and boom dividing line? 
(A more complete and detailed coverage of manipulators is found in REMOTE 
HANDLING OF GE-ANPD DIRECT AIR CYCLE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, Chapter 5, 
Section 2. ) (In preparation) 
5 - 4  Viewing 
One of the most limiting factors in remote handling operations is the viewing 
problem. At best, the operator must be located a considerable distance from the 
work point, particularly in the larger hot cells or when utilizing remote control 
vehicles I 
- Viewing Windows - A common and probably the best over-all viewing device 
is the high density shield window. 
view the operation in his normal viewing manner, with full advantage of his natural 
stereo depth perception, with high resolution wide angle coverage, and with a 
minimum of distortion, 
for  shadows, binoculars, mi r ro r s  or other aids can be employed, A number of 
observers may monitor the work as well as the operator, at the same time and with 
both detailed and overaall visual coverage. 
A high quality window allows the operator to 
Where necessary viewing aids such as special lighting 
Monochromatic light is used with the thick shield windows to eliminate the 
color effect of chromatic abermWnn The loss of 
color is a disadvantage of this syste 
ment when installed in adequate numbers to provide viewing angles and coverage. 
destroys good resolution. 
indows also represent a sizeable invest- 
- Periscopes - Periscopes a r e  often used as viewing aids in a hot cell. 
they a r e  limited to a single viewerp have a relatively narrow field and do not 
afford stereo vision their use is not suitable as a primary viewing system, 
able power eyepieces, excellent resolution, full color and adaptability for photo- 
graphic uses makes them very useful for  general hot cell inspection work, 
scopes a r e  less  expensive than windows, can be turned for full hemispherical 
coverage and can be moved to different locations without serious difficulty. 
Since 
V a r i -  
Per i -  
2% 
- Television - Television is used as a primary viewing system in certain types 
of operations. 
controlled vehicles, television is often the only viewing means possible. 
major advantage of television is the mobility of the viewpoint; cameras can be 
positioned in practically any location for viewing at various angles. It is very 
useful in hot cells for providing a view at right angles to the operatorPs normal 
line of sight, providing good triangulation, 
also possible in  difficult locations such as inside tanks, pipes or behind various 
obstructions. 
Where direct vision is impossible, such as guidance for radio 
The 
Inspection or  manipulator guidance is 
Characteristics of television, which limit its usefulness, a r e  poor resolutioq, 
sensitivity to high radiation levels, maintenance requirements and vulnerability 
to physical damage, 
rather than initial investment. 
a r e  available but have proven to be of only limited value in improvement of over- 
all visual effectiveness, (See Remote Handling of GE-ANPD. .+ * - Chapter 5, 
Section 6. ) 
Relatively high costs a r e  more a function of maintenance 
Systems which provide color and stereo pictures 
5,5 Remote Handling in Support of Nuclear Rocket Testing 
Ground testing of nuclear rocket systems will  involve remote handling pro- 
cedure&thst parallel those used in the ANP program, 
and radioactive components is quite similar, as a re  the radiation levels, and the 
cyclic nature of work loads is comparable, 
WRDC was to some extent modeled after the Idaho Hot Shop and is very similar 
though slightly smaller than the Idaho Hot Shop, General size, shape, layout, 
manipulators and booms a r e  very similar or  identical to those in Idaho. It seems 
reasonable, therefore, that the remote handling philosophy for servicing the 
nuclear rocket systems will  also be similar to that which evolved during the ANP 
reactor service operations. 
The size of test vehicles 
The hot cell which was  built on the 
A point of significant difference, which has not yet received much attention, is 
that the final product, the nuclear rocket for a one-way space mission may not 
need to i n c s r p ~ r a t e  remote handling provisions, assuming that no orbital "Hot 
Shopr1 is built, Since the remote handling provisions on the power plant tend to 
increase weight and cost and may decrease reliability, they should be eliminated 
from the final product if possible, 
invalidating the reliability estimates resulting from the ground tes t  program. 
The problem, of course, is to do so without 
Some basic points or guidelines which seem appropriate for remote handling of 
mobile reactor systems are listed below, 
rockets as well as to the nuclear aircraft  engine tes t  systems f rom which they 
were derived. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
They will  generally apply to nuclear 
Perform fully remote operations oidy when necessary, 
Design the product (nuclear rocket engines and components) to  stay within 
the limits of present day "state of the art" of remote handling. 
Plan service and remote handling operations into the product design at a11 
stages, 
4, 
6. 
7. 
8. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13, 
14. 
15. . 
16, 
18. 
Plan and TEST all remote handling jigs, fixtures, manipulators or other 
equipment prior to %ottt operations (on actual hardware). 
Utilize jigs, fixtures and supporting equipment to reduce the demands on 
the general purpose handling equipment, and to reduce the weight penalty 
on flight type hardware, 
Utilize semi-remote operations where possible and advantageoue. 
Use personnel shields and special equipment to permit manual operations 
where feasible and advantageous. 
Provide remote handling facilities with a Itfarnilytt of manipulators with 
the size range covering small and large tasks to be undertaken. 
Use standard proven equipment and tooling where possible; avoid developing 
special equipment except when necessary. 
Remotely subdivide assemblies into components which can be decontaminated 
and serviced manually. 
Perform remote operations which can eliminate other remote work (e, g, + 
make a remote adjustment on a component rather than remove the component 
f rom a radioactive assembly for a manual adjustment). 
connections rather than many separate small components, 
Group connectors, lines, latches, etc, I for ease of remote viewing and 
equipment acces s, 
Provide adequate and generous clearances for the remote assembly of parts, 
Provide guide pins, guides and other assembly aids, 
Provide captive hardware {bolts, nuts, miscellaneous fastecers, pins, etc), 
Avoid "blEndr1 operations and those where it is not possible visually to  check, 
inspect or  tes t  f i t  'up and coiii 
Avoid critical components which cannot be replaced (e, g. 
in a flange), 
Design ttpackagetl systems for remote handling with automatic and group 
threaded holes 
5. .6 General 
Remote handling operations a r e  time consuming and difficult, cornpared to 
normal manual operations o€ a similar nature, 
may take many times the normal manual time to perform a relatively simple job. 
Installation of a standard bolt and nut in a flange may require as much as 10 to 
20 t imes as long to perform remotely, E&rac thg  a broken stud from a flange is 
probably impossible remotely. Some operations such as loosening P bolt on a 
flange or a number of bolts, may be loager by a factor of only 2 or  3 compared to 
manual time s 
Depending on the complexity, it 
Due to the lack of physical contact with the operating hardware it is necessary 
Components may be damaged by the manipulator, or 
to perform tests o r  checks on various remote operations more closely than for 
similar manual operations. 
items which a r e  already unserviceable may go by undetected without human con- 
tact. 
Disabled handling equipment can often delay operations and may require 
" I  extensive repairs as well as  delays due to removal of the radiation source so that 
repairs can be made. 
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Remote operations and equipment a r e  relatively expensive, A complete 100 
pound capacity manipulator a articulated boom mount, controls and necessary 
support equipment costs about $250,000, 
Extensive planning, careful de sign and tremendous patience a re  all requisites 
of a successful remote handling operation. 
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6.0 POST OPERATIONAL EXAMINATION 
At the conclusion of the test  series many of the tes t  objectives wi l l  have been 
fulfilled. Much more valuable information can be obtained, however, from the 
laboratory examination of the power plant. 
To illustrate the extent of post operational testing which may be applicable, the 
following section is quoted from a proposed examination procedure for a SNAP 
reactor following tests in  the STEP (Safety Test Engineering Program). 
a particular interesting illustration since it was prepared with virtually no infor- 
matio as to the construction of the reactor. Its therefore, accurately reflects 
the wide range of general purpose laboratory tests without getting into specific 
details 
This is 
Laboratorv Examination 
General: 
"Photographs at appropriate magnifications will be taken covering each 
point of special interest throughout the entire laboratory processing opera- 
tions. 
macro examinations and from 25X to over Z O O O X  for microstructiire studies. 
Two new fuel pins will be set aside and used for laboratory contpols through- 
out the examination. In addition, it is assumed that a complete inspection 
report on the pre-run condition of all fuel pins will  be available. 
The magnifications available range f r o m  I/ 2X to 30X during the 
1 
Non-Des tructive Testing 
"Following the static and limited kinetic experiments the following tests 
wil l  be applied to assess  the extent of damage and to certify fuel pins for 
reuse during the destructive tests. 
- The core assemblyz including the upper and lower tube sheets and all 
fuel pins, will be removed from the cans examined to locate any geo- 
metric trends in  damaged areas, and disassembled. Each pin will be 
given a n  over -d l  examination for obvious material failures. 
- The can will receive a careful surface examination and over-all 
dimensional checks at several points to measure deformations due to 
high or uneven temperature zones 
the initial test will be e d n e d  and the cause of failure determined. 
Instrumentation that failed during 
-, The length and diameter of each fuel pin will be measured at several 
points to an accuracy of O.0Ol1', 
pin will be taken. to measure both over-all material  losses or  gains 
and over-d3. dimension changes. 
The weight and density of each fuel 
32 
- Zyglo, magnaflux or  dye penetrant tests will be used to detect cracks 
in  metals and welds. 
irradiation to establish which rmzthod would be the most suitable in  this 
particular case and to verify the initial condition of the pins, 
Tests should be made on several  of the pins before 
.. Ultrasonic testing may be used to detect separations between the clad- 
ding and fuel-moderator material (or any hydrogen barr ier)  that may  be 
presentp as well as to measure the cladding thickness itself. It will 
likely be performed only on pins considered for re-use and would be 
carried aut semi-remotely (shielded dry-box) or  by direct handling. 
. Radiography can be performed i n  dl cases where the pins a r e  of 
sufficiently low radioactivity to avoid film fogging, and would be of 
considerable value in assessing the quality of the end welds and the 
physical integrity of the moderator-fuel bodies. 
- Each fuel pin will be gamm-scanned t o  determine relative power 
distributions in  the core during the reactor tes ts ,  These data will 
later be correlated with fission product analyses in  cut samples to 
determine absolute power distributions. 
"Fuel pins which successfully pass all of the above examinations and 
tests will be se t  aside for re-use, 
Destructive Testing 
"Following disassembly of the reactor, the following tests will be 
applied to pins failing to meet re-use integrity requirements and to 
all pins at the conclusion of the f i n d  destructive test:: 
- Free  hydrogen gas in capsule will be. determined PB a measurement 
of moderator hydrogen loss on fuel pins having no holes or cracks 
in  the cladding. 
the cladding punctured remotely and the hydrogen collected and 
measuredo 
The pin would be inserted into a vacuum systemo 
- The cladding will be stripped from each pin and any hydrogen 
barr ier  which may be present examined and sampled for m y  further 
testing which migh appear appropriate. 
removed from the fuel body. 
weighed and given a microscopic surface examination for flaws and 
cracks 
The barr ier  will the% be 
Each pin wil l  be checked dimensionally, 
- Small samples will be cut at various radial and long i tud id  positions 
from one radial se t  of pins, Each sample will be analyzed for total 
hydrogen (and, by inference, temperature) distributions in  bath the 
individual pins and the wh61-e peactor. 
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- Samples taken adjacent to those listed immediately above will be 
analyzed for those fission products usually used as a measure of 
integrated fluxes, such as CO'~~, Zr95 -Nb95, Cs137 and Ba I 40 Lal 40 
The gamma scanning data discussed above could then be normalized, 
using these absolute determinations, to obtain absolute power distri- 
butions in the entire core. 
- A third set  of samples, c-adjacent to the above listed sets  in a 
few selected representative areas, wi l l  be mounted and studied 
metallographically to determine the condition of the uranium-zirconium 
hydride matrix and assess radiation or temperature damage to its 
structure. 
- Typical clad and clad weld a reas  (if any) in which cracks or  other 
physical defects were found during the Zyglo or dye-check tests will 
also be mounted for microstructure study in order to determine the 
cause and degree of failure. 
- Several selected fuel axeas could be sampled for crystal structure 
study by x-ray diffraction, in  those cases where the film wuuld not 
be fogged excessively, as a back -up to the metallographic work in  
identifying phase changes in  the matrix. These changes would be 
particularly likely to occur at the interfaces between uranium and 
zirconium particles, ' I  
7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As a means of 
like to sketch out 
summarizing the operation of the nuclear power plant, I would 
a possible sequence of steps that would occur in the preparation 
of a nuclear rocket for launching. 
reactor and engine. 
isolated from other facilities so that in the event of an accident, a nuclear runaway 
of some sort, the number of people and the amount of equipment which would be 
subjected to damage would be minimized, 
critical experiment cells which would essentially be heavily shielded concrete 
rooms in which the fuel would be loaded to achieve the desired critical mass. In 
these cells also various checkouts of the reactor systems would be carried out to 
make sure that the actual configuration was consistent with the one desired. 
Following the assembly of the reactor itself and the functional checkout of the 
reactor controls and instrumentation, the remainder of the engine components 
would be attached, such as the nozzle, turbo-pump and associated plumbing, The 
various components such as shielding and other stage hardware which might affect 
the criticality of the reactor would be mocked up. At this point, still at the engine 
assembly facility and in a critical experiment cello the control rod positions would 
be calibrated for the desired startup position. 
present philosophy that the rocket startup would be accomplished by moving the 
control elements to a pre-determined position rather than by a closed loop servo. 
When this calibration of control elements and reactor instrumentation has been 
completed, the reactor control drums would be secured by a mechanical device 
such as a pin, which would make it impossible for any of the control elements to 
move, At this point the reactor is essentially as hilrmless as any other piece of 
hardware, and has a negligible radiation field surrounding it. 
The first step would be the assembly of the 
This operation would require a separate facility, presumably 
h 
This facility would contain one or more 
This is in accordance with the 
1 
When completely assembled and checked out at the engine assembly facility, 
the nuclear engine is ready for a shipment to the stage assembly areao 
types of reactors a danger is involved in this transfer in that the reactor might 
accidently be submerged in w a t e r  or  other moderating fluids. 
cautions must be taken to insure either that there is no water a r w n d  into which it 
might fall, or  that the reactor will not go critical if it i s  dropped in the water, such 
a s  by the basic design of the reactor or  by adding poison placed temporarily in the 
coolant passages, 
no hazard to the operation at all. 
In certain 
Appropriate pre- 
Aside from this the reactor in  the safety condition represents 
At the stage assembly area,  which is part of the regular vehicle assembly 
complex, the engine will be asse,pbled to the stage tank. 
engine controller wil l  be connected’ 
system used in the engine assembly facility. 
the operation of the engine controller to make sure that the correct polarity, con- 
tinuity, and so forth exists f rom the engine control system down to the reactor 
control drum. 
with the engine controller. 
perly designed reactor is incapable of going critical on a single control element. 
At this pUint the actual 
Therefore, it is pertinent to check 
the reactor instead of the facility control 
To accomplish this, one drum at a time would be freed and operated 
This is again a step of negligible danger since pro- 
h 
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The stage would then be transferred to the vehicle assembly area. During this 
In operation, of course, the previous comments about immersion in water apply. 
the vehicle assembly a rea  the nuclear stage is then assembled to the booster stages 
and is completely checked out and prepared for launch. It wil l  probably not be 
necessary to remove the mechanical safeties on the reactor at this point, since the 
function of the control system has been checked out f rom the stage controller down 
through the control elements previously. 
The entire vehicle is then moved to the launch site and here a new hazard ar ises;  
It is unlikely that the reactor would in the hazard of a chemical explosion and fire. 
any way add a significant 
Although it is hard to insure that the reactor could not melt down into a more critical 
configuration, the possibility is sufficiently remote that it probably does not require 
any significant changes in the operating procedure. 
lear  hazard to the very extensive chemical hazard. 
At the launching site, finally, the mechanical constraints or safeties on the con- 
t rol  drums wil l  be removed as a final step. Here a nuclear hazard is conceivable in 
that malfunction in the control system might cause the reactor to operate prematurely. 
However, this type of malfunction can probably be precluded by the use of redundant 
systems and electrical safety systems, or it is possible that the reactor would be 
safetied by poison wires in the coolant passages which would be pulled out at stage 
separation. 
is assured, 
Thus, by one system or another, the safety of the reactor at this point 
This sequence of operations is rather generalized, but it does serve to illustrate 
probably sufficiently accurate to permit the conclusion that preparing nuclear rockets 
for  launch would not materially add to the existing hazards at the launch site. 
/ the considerations that would be involved in establishing detailed procedures. It is 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Instruction 
This is a sample instruction identifying actions to be taken and documents 
which should be prepared for internal use at the reactor test station prior to 
reactor operation. The s ple instruction is based on an instruction used in 
the G E  Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Department. 
an over-all organization identified as the "Department" within which there is 
a "Reactor Project" and a "Test Station". 
The instruction assumes 
Department 
Reactor Project 
Test Station 
- Test Engineering 
- Test Operations - Shops and Facilities 
- Security, Health, and Safety 
Other 
The Reactor Project is assumed to have designed and built the reactor o r  power 
plant and has delivered it to the Tes t  Station together with requests for test data. 
The T e s t  Station is internally organized into subordinate organizations designated 
as Test Engineering, Test Operations, Shops and Facilities, and Security, Health 
and Safety. 
PROCEDURES PRELIMNARY TO REACTOR OR 
OPERATIONS AT TEST STATION 
I. Policy 
POWER PLANT 
It is the policy of the Department to operate all tests in such a way as to 
minimize the possibility of events hazardous to personnel o r  property or 
which might unintentionally damage or destroy a tes t  device with consequent 
delay to the programs of the Department. 
Q. 
i 
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11. General 
A. 
i 
In keeping with the above policy, this Instruction outlines certain 
documents and approvals to be completed prior to the operation of any 
tes t  involving a nuclear reactor at the Test Station. 
in  such a manner as to provide for full pre-analysis and review prior to 
operation while still maintaining the direct line responsibilities of 
personnel involved. 
These a r e  formalized 
B. Documents required prior to the operation of any specific power plant 
or  reactor at the Test Station are: 
1.  Facility Operating Manual 
2. 
3.  Test Program and Procedures 
4. Permission to Operate 
Standard Reactor or Power Plant Operating Procedure 
e.. Approvals required for these documents a r e  specified below. 
III. Document Procedure 
A. Facility Operating Manual 
1. For each facility in which reactors are to be operated, a Facility 
Operating Manual wi l l  be prepared. 
such items as  the following: 
This Manual will include 
a. Description of and procedure for operation, calibration, 
cE_ec.kout, and maintenance of facility equipments for  reactor 
or power plant operation. These equipments include: data 
system, radioactivity monitoring devices 9 comrnunication, 
ventilation, power9 air, fuel, etc. 
b, Description of the organization of the operating personnel, 
defining responsibLki$y, authority, and the work of all 
personnel 
c, Regulations regarding security, access,  safety, and evacuation. 
2. The Facility Test Operations Supervisor is responsible for the 
preparation and issue of the Facility Operating Manual. 
Manual shall be reviewed and approved by the following: 
This 
Manager - Reactor Test  Operations 
Manager - Security, Health and Safety 
Manager . Shop Operations and Facilities Services 
Manager Test Engineering 
Manager - Test Station 
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B, Standard Reactor Operating Procedure 
1. For each reactor to be operated in a facility, a Standard Reactor 
Operating Procedure will be prepared. 
include such items as the following:: 
This Procedure will 
a, Explicit start-up and steady power operating procedures both 
manual and automatic as applicable, 
b. Maintenance, calibration, and checkout procedures to be 
followed at the facillty for dl components and systems corn- 
prising the reactor o r  power plant assembly, 
c. Cal ibra t i~n  and checkout procedure for reactor or power plant 
as it relates to the facility or installation. 
2. When a Reactor Operating Manual is provided by the Reactor 
Project, it w i 4 1  be used as a reference in the preparation of the 
Standard Reactor Operating Procedure. 
between. the Standard Reacgor Operating Procedure and the Reactor 
Operating Manual., 
resolvedt and all pertinent documents accordingly revised o r  
suitably noted. 
There shall be no conflicts 
Should any suck conflicts ar ise ,  they must be 
3 ,  The Facility Test Operations Supervisor is responsible for the 
preparation and issue of the Standard Reactor Operating Procedure. 
This Procedure shall be reviewed and approved by the €ofslowing:: 
Manager - Reactor Test Operations 
Manager - Test Engineering 
Manager - Security, Health and Safety 
Manager - Reactor Project 
Manager - Test Station 
C, Test Program and Procedures 
1 * For each specific test or  tes t  se r ies  to be performed involving a 
nuclear reactoro a Test P r sg rm and Procedures document dll 
be prepared. 
in  writing from the Reactor Project. This  test  request shall be 
addressed to the appropriate Test  Station project programs unit 
within Test Engineering. 
The tes t  program will be based on a test  request 
2, Teat request must include the following: 
a. Purpose and objective o b  test, with list of data and information 
req~,! r cd. 
3 
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b. Ekpected operating characteristics or data based on pre-test 
analysis . 
C. Special comments pertaining to special notice that should be 
taken and special limitations that-may exist. 
3,  Based on the tes t  requests, the Test Program and Procedures 
will be prepared. This will contain: 
a. A detailed description of each test and expected test  data. 
b. The detailed procedures to be following in  each test, including 
list of instrumentation and test  equipment necessary to obtain 
the data, 
C ,  Wherever, in  the conduct of the test, discretionary action is 
intended for or provided for the reactor operator, it will be so 
stated. 
action, it will be understood that ILO discretion is provided the 
operator , except to shutdown. 
In the absence of any statement as to discretionary 
d. A list of any tests included in the test requests and not included 
in  the test program with a statement as to why. 
4, The following Test Station organization components a r e  responsible 
for preparation of portions of the Test Programs and Procedures 
Document as below: 
a. The Facility Test Operations Supervisor, for the facility 
involved, for the specific test procedure, 
b, The Supervisor - Health and Hygiene for the special health and 
hygiene monitoring and measuring procedures a$plicable 
c. The Supervisor - Analysis for expected key data and special 
limits as applicable, 
d, The Supervisor .. Instrument Engineering for special calibration 
procedures as applicable, 
e. The Supervisor - Project Programs for the specific tes t  program 
and for compiling and editing the final document and initiating 
the approval sequence 
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5, The Test Program and Procedures shall be reviewed and approved 
by the following: 
Manager - Reactor Test Operations 
Manager - Test  Engineering 
Manager - Security, Health and Safety 
Manager - Reactor Project 
Manager - Test  Station 
60 When a reactor operator finds he cannot operate a test in con- 
formance with the Test Program and Procedures, he will  dis- 
continue the test until after the resolution of the problem, 
Resolution of the problem m-ay be made by the Facility Test 
Operations Supervisor, Supervisor - Analysis, and the Supervisor- 
Project Programs * The agreed upon solution, revision to pro- 
cedure, o r  revision to program shall be documented and signed 
by the above. 
log or records and shall be sent to a14 individuals W ~ Q  reviewed 
and approved the initial Test Program and Procedures Document, 
Copies shall be filed in the suitable facility test 
The Supervisor - Project Programs9 in accordance with assigned 
responsibilities, ik responsible for consulting with and representing 
the cognizant Reactor Project or ganisation. 
7, After each test  or each test period, the data a d  operating results 
shall be reviewed by the Facility Test Operations Supervisor, 
Supervisor - Analysis, and the Supervisor - Project Programs. 
Indicated desirable adjustments to procedure or program2 as 
agreed uponp shall be documented and signed by the above, 
shall be filed in  the suitable facility test log or records, and shall 
be sent to all individuals who reviewed and approved the initial 
Test  Program and Procedures document, 
Copies 
D, For each test, test series, or group of tests and test series, the 
Manager - Test Station will issue a document granting permission tQ 
operate, T M s  will be based on the completion and availability of the 
following documents : 
1. Operating permission for the particular reactor involved and 
planned general test program from the Department General 
Manager , 
2, Facility Operating Manual for the facility i n  which the tests are to 
be conducted. 
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3, 
4. 
5. 
Standard Reactor Operating Procedure for the reactor involved in  
the facility involved, 
Test  Program and Procedures for the tests planned. 
The permission to  operate will also state any other special 
limitations . 
IV. Review or  Inspection Procedure 
A. For  each facility and/or reactor a Review Board, appointed by the 
Manager - Test Station, will review the facility and/or reactors 
as follows: 
1. When any major change has been made in the facility. 
2. When any reactor not previously operated in  the facility is 
installed therein for testing. 
3. At other times to  provide a review at approximately three-month 
periods * 
The Review Board will operate in  a consultative or advisory capacity. 
Each review will be reported on to the Manager - Test Station in 
writing. 
B. The Manager - Test Engineering is responsible for maintaining a 
schedule of required reviews and advising the Manager - Test Statim. 
C, The Manager - Reactor Test  Operations is responsible for codormance 
to approved operating procedures, and through him the Test Facility 
Supervisor. The Manager - Reactor Test  Operations and his 
Supervisors are responsible for trdning, knowledge, and competence 
of the tes t  organization and reactor operators, 
The Manager - Reactor Test Operations and Test  Facility Supervisor 
.are responsible for operating at all times i n  a safe rnanner, and a x e  
responsible at all times €or shutting down, OF not operating, when in  
their judgment operations would not meet the Department policy on 
safe operations. 
